Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women of Color by Aziz, Sahar F.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2015
Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim
Women of Color
Sahar F. Aziz
Texas A&M University School of Law, saziz@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and
the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sahar F. Aziz, Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women of Color, 24 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 341 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/717
Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women of 
Color† 






Thank you to Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems and the 
Journal of Gender, Race & Justice for inviting me, and a special thanks to 
Professor Wing for hosting us today. You all are very fortunate to have 
Professor Wing as an advisor and mentor here at the University of Iowa 
College of Law.  
Today, I have been asked to address the domestic context of civil rights 
issues facing Muslim women in the United States. Admittedly, examining the 
experiences of Muslim American women is a risky endeavor because they are 
such a diverse group of women ethnically, racially, socio-economically, and 
religiously in terms of their levels of religiosity.1 Hence, I acknowledge the risk 
of essentializing, despite my best efforts to recognize the individual agency of 
each Muslim woman.   
This lecture is based on a larger project that examines the myriad ways 
Muslim women are adversely affected by their intersectional identities, and 
how it impacts their ability to be economically independent through gainful 
employment. Due to time constraints, I will be summarizing my thesis and 
supporting arguments on this complex topic. For those interested in delving 
into the details, I refer you to my article in the Michigan Journal of Race & 
Law entitled, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity 
Performance in the Workplace.2 My presentation today also builds on the thesis 
of a prior article, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American 
† This Article is also featured in Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. Please use a string citation 
when referencing this Article: Sahar F. Aziz, Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women 
of Color, 24(2) TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 18(2) J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 389 (2015).  
∗ Professor Aziz is a professor at Texas A&M University School of Law where she teaches civil 
rights and Middle East law.  She thanks Professors Richard Delgado, Gerald Torres, Kevin 
Johnson, Adrien Wing, Neil Gotanda, Camille Rich, Jose “Beto” Juarez, Wendy Greene, Ben Davis 
Shirin Sinnar, and Xuan-Thao Nguyen for their feedback on the larger research project on which 
this essay is based.  I also thank my co-panelists, Professors Karima Bennoune, Shafiqa Ahmadi, 
Seval Yildirim, and Mounira Charrad, for their insightful feedback during the conference.  I also 
thank Texas A&M School of Law student Ben Nystrom for his excellent research assistance. 
1 SHAHNAZ KHAN, MUSLIM WOMEN: CRAFTING A NORTH AMERICAN IDENTITY 42 (2000). 
2 See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity 
Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101 (2014) [hereinafter Aziz, Coercive 
Assimilationism]. 
                                                 
342 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 24:341 
 
Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality,3 wherein I proffer that Muslim 
women are caught in the crosshairs of bias at the intersection of religion, 
gender, and race or ethnicity.  
After September 11, 2001, the stereotype of Muslim women as terrorists, 
co-conspirators, or aiders and abettors to their male terrorist family members 
has superseded the stereotype that they are oppressed, subjugated, infantile 
beings, without individual agency who need to be saved by upper-middle-class 
white American women.4 Because a woman’s financial independence 
contributes towards her ability to defend her rights and pursue the lifestyle of 
her choosing, the treatment of women in the workplace is fundamental to 
discussions on women’s rights, whether in the United States or abroad. As 
such, my presentation today theorizes how implicit bias, stereotyping, and 
assimilationist demands adversely affect Muslim women of color in 
employment.  
Specifically, I will examine how bias at the intersection of gender and 
religion has affected Muslim women’s identity performance at work as they 
struggle to receive equal opportunity in hiring, equal pay, promotions, equal 
professional development opportunities, and the same treatment as other 
similarly-situated employees. In doing so, I coin the term “coercive 
assimilationism” as a form of implicit and explicit bias, which adversely affects 
minorities in many white-collar professional workplaces—the hypothetical 
backdrop of my analysis.   
While assimilation into a particular workplace is imposed on all employees 
to a certain degree, I distinguish between assimilationist demands 
intrinsically associated with one’s race, gender, religion, or ethnicity based on 
negative stereotypes and those that are objectively job-related.5 Because an 
employee’s income, career trajectory, and other employment opportunities are 
at stake, the expectation to assimilate is inherently coercive even if consciously 
voluntary.     
Coercive assimilation manifests itself in workplace rules that are both 
written and unwritten.  These rules reward minority employees who behave, 
talk, dress, and otherwise mirror the majority group, which, in 2015, I posit is 
white, heterosexual, Christian, and male.6 Rewards include being hired in the 
3 See Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the 
Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191 (2012). 
4 See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands 
Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALA. L. REV. 299, 302 (2006) (noting that persons of 
intersectional minority groups “experience a qualitatively different kind of subordination”).  
5 See generally Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace Appearance 
Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288–89 (2009) (noting that Title VII has yet to solve a 
new manifestation of discrimination: “trait discrimination”). 
6 Id. at 296. 
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first place,7 equal pay, and professional development opportunities that could 
include training, client interaction, receiving high quality assignments, and 
other perks that come from being a member of “the team.”8 In contrast, 
employees who refuse or are unable to adhere to coercive assimilationism 
suffer adverse employment actions ranging from a stagnant career trajectory 
to termination. In the end, failing to assimilate may result in intergroup 
discrimination based on intragroup differences rooted in implicit or explicit 
stereotyping.9  
In the case of Muslim women, coercive assimilationism places them in a 
catch-twenty-two. Specifically, Muslim women suffer harm regardless of what 
decision they make—to accommodate or to refuse to accommodate coercive 
assimilationism—because the stereotypes that shape what is expected of them 
by the majority group contradict each other. This places Muslim women in a 
triple bind at the intersection of gender, religion, and race/ethnicity. For 
example, if she behaves like a “good Muslim woman” who is not passive, 
subjugated, or meek, then she may fall into the trap of being perceived as a 
“bad woman”—who is too assertive, overtly ambitious, and abrasive—resulting 
in her being labeled “a bitch.” Similarly, in her attempts to dispel stereotypes 
that she is unable to think critically, incapable of leading, or lacking strength 
of character, she may trigger stereotypes held by her coworkers that Muslims 
are aggressive, prone to violence, untrustworthy, and disloyal outsiders.10 
Thus, whether Muslim women act as their authentic selves—whatever that 
means for a particular woman—or if they intentionally shape their social, 
religious, and racial identities to accommodate the expectations of the majority 
group, their identity performance is ill-fated. Regardless of whether a Muslim 
woman chooses or refuses to accommodate coercive assimilationist demands, 
she is unlikely to become a member of the in-group and incur the consequent 
benefits.11    
Contradictory stereotypes are often a product of both explicit and implicit 
bias.  Implicit bias, in particular, plays a larger role in discriminatory behavior 
today than the explicit biases on full display in the 1960s when Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act was passed.12  Consequently, Title VII does not 
7 See generally LAUREN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: HOW ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS 6–7 (2015). 
8 Id.  
9 Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism, supra note 2, at 105–06. 
10 See generally Haleh Afshar, The Politics of Fear: What Does It Mean to Those Who Are Otherized 
and Feared?, 36 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 9 (2013), 
http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/01419870.2013.738821 
(discussing the implications of systemic and entrenched demonization of Muslims by the media 
and politicians). 
11 See Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects in Natural 
and Minimal Groups, 112(3) PSYCHOL. BULL. 536, 536 (1992) (noting that people tend to favor, in 
terms of resource allocation, members of their own group than members of other groups). 
12 See, e.g., Bandsuch, supra note 5, at 317–19 (arguing for a totality of the circumstances approach 
to Title VII, which would scrutinize whether “certain community standards have a demeaning or 
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adequately remedy discrimination arising from implicit biases that produce 
unspoken, but nonetheless prevalent, negative stereotypes incorporated into 
workplace rules and professionalism discourse.  
Before delving into the perils of Muslim women’s identity performance in 
the workplace, I want to summarize the basic doctrine for a Title VII 
employment discrimination claim. Under Title VII, a plaintiff has the burden 
of proving the following: (1) she is a member of a protected class, which includes 
gender, race, color, ethnicity, or religion; (2) she suffered an adverse 
employment action, including, but not limited to, failure to hire, termination, 
failure to promote, or unequal pay compared to other similarly situated 
employees; and (3) that her protected class status was a motivating factor in 
the alleged adverse employment action.13 If she is able to make a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the 
employer to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action, and if the employer is successful, then the employee has 
the burden of proof to demonstrate that the proffered reason was, in fact, 
pretext.14 In proving that her protected status was a motivating factor for the 
adverse employment action, the plaintiff must typically rely on circumstantial 
evidence arising from implicit bias because evidence of explicit bias is often 
unavailable.15   
In addition, the plaintiff must compare herself to similarly situated 
employees in terms of skills, experience, education, and other job qualifications 
in order to succeed in a Title VII employment discrimination suit.16 Often this 
involves looking to the employer’s treatment of similarly situated male, non-
Muslim, or white employees. For instance, the plaintiff may point to a man 
who is paid more for the same work as proof that she experienced unlawful 
disparate treatment, or she may point to a white employee who received a 
promotion that she was denied. When there are other employees in the same 
protected class as the plaintiff, however, an employer will typically point to 
offensive history of stereotypes or bias, the potential to force assimilation, or an adverse impact on 
employment opportunities”).  
13  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Rudin v. Lincoln Land 
Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Circumstantial evidence of discrimination . . . 
allows the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” (internal 
quotation omitted)); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 
1059 (2006) (noting that most cases rely on circumstantial evidence). 
14 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04. 
15 Per McDonnell Douglas, at the prima facie stage, when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial 
evidence in order to justify mandating an employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must produce persuasive evidence that 
raises a presumption of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 792. 
16 See Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on a claim for 
discrimination under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, [the plaintiff] must show that: . 
. . [she] was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside [her] protected 
class.”). 
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such employees to counter allegations that the adverse employment action was 
unlawfully taken based on a protected class. For example, if there are other 
Muslim women in the workplace, the employer may point to a Muslim woman 
who has not experienced the same adverse treatment as the plaintiff as proof 
that the basis of the action against the plaintiff was merit-based and lawful. It 
is in such circumstances when coercive assimilationism can play a pernicious 
role in producing intergroup discrimination based on differences in identity 
performance among members of the same protected class(es).  Muslim women 
willing and able to accommodate assimilationist demands may be granted 
better employment opportunities than Muslim women whose behavior, dress, 
speech, and associations do not accommodate assimilationist demands, or 
cause discomfort to the majority group. A fault line is thus created between the 
“good Muslim woman” who assimilates (voluntarily or because of pressure to 
do so) and the “bad Muslim woman” who performs her gender, religious, or 
racial identity in ways that the majority group disapproves, finds offensive, or 
finds discomforting.17 The result is intergroup discrimination based on 
intragroup differences, which the judiciary often fails to recognize.   
This proposition begs the question of what types of behaviors, dress, and 
speech might be looked upon as threatening or, by contrast, normal to the 
majority group? Admittedly, an attempt to answer this question risks 
essentializing both the majority group and the minority employees at issue. 
Nevertheless, I think it warrants a discussion to expose the pervasiveness of 
implicit bias rooted in negative stereotypes of particular groups and the myriad 
harms that result. Kenji Yoshino’s groundbreaking work on converting, 
passing, and covering of minority groups as identity performance strategies 
offers insights into the experiences of Muslim women of color in the 
workplace.18   
“Converting” entails changing one’s underlying identity altogether.19 A 
Muslim woman who decides to engage in converting her identity may do the 
following: convert from Islam to Christianity, legally change her ethnic-
sounding name to a common American name, and marry a white Christian 
male. The converted woman would raise her children in a white Christian 
community, socialize with other white Christian families, and effectively live 
a life where no one knows or has reason to know that she was born and raised 
by a non-white Muslim family. In her mind, and in the minds of others, she is 
a white Christian female of European origin. In the end, she has converted out 
of her subordinated identity and into the majority group’s identity.  
17 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 
714–19 (2001). See generally DEVON CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE 
IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013).  
18 Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772–73 (2002).  
19 Id. at 772. 
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“Passing” occurs when the underlying identity is retained, but masked.20 
A Muslim woman who adopts passing as an identity performance strategy 
keeps her underlying identity, but hides it from her employers and coworkers. 
She hopes her coworkers will mistakenly believe she is a white Christian 
woman, and thereby avoid the adverse effects of being marked as a member of 
a subordinated group. Accordingly, a Muslim woman of color may keep her 
legal non-European name, but at work go by a common nickname, like Katie 
instead of Khadija or Sue instead of Su’ad, such that none of her coworkers 
know that her real name is not an English name. She may hide her associations 
with other Muslims, or people of her racial or ethnic background, from her 
coworkers. She may marry a man that also goes by an English nickname and 
passes as a white non-Muslim based on his appearance, dress, and speech. She 
may name her children cross-over names that can be both Arabic and English, 
or Urdu and English, such as Sarah, Adam, Jenna, Sophia, Zack, or Sammy. 
She may not disclose her travels to her country of origin, so as to not trigger 
suspicions of divided national loyalties. Her social and professional dress is 
western and liberal, such that nothing about her appearance discloses her 
Muslim identity. If anyone were to accidentally discover her ethnic heritage or 
religious identity, they would surprisingly remark, “I had no idea you were 
Arab,” or “I had no idea you were Muslim,” to which she would dismissively 
point out that it is her parents’ identity and quickly change the subject. 
For converting or passing to be an option for a particular Muslim woman, 
she must literally “look white” in terms of skin tone and phenotype.  For many 
Muslim women of color in the United States, the majority of whom are either 
African American or recent immigrants from Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, 
converting and passing is not an option, even if it is desired by that particular 
woman.21 This leaves covering as the predominant identity performance 
strategy for those seeking to accommodate assimilationist demands.  
“Covering” is the adoption of appearances, associations, speech, and 
behaviors that allay the majority group’s discomfort with or fear of the 
minority group.22 In covering her identity, a Muslim woman retains and 
discloses her underlying identity, but performs it in such a way that it makes 
it more palatable and more comforting to the majority group.  She consciously 
seeks to avoid making the majority group feel threatened or uncomfortable 
with her Muslim and ethnic identity. As such, the identity-covering Muslim 
woman may do the following: refrain from wearing a headscarf; speak in 
unaccented English with the local vernacular accent; straighten her otherwise 
curly hair, wear clothes viewed as Western and liberal, as opposed to 
conservative and Islamic; and go out of her way to express her patriotism to 
20 Id. 
21  See Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, The Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years 
After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33, 45–46 (2009) (providing a summary of the diverse races and 
ethnicities that comprise the Muslim community in the United States).  
22 Yoshino, supra note 18, at 772.  
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the United States, such as supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Rather than criticize her coworkers when they make bigoted or Orientalist 
jokes about Muslims or her country of origin, the identity-covering Muslim 
woman either laughs along with her coworkers or refrains from challenging 
their prejudices. If she is a practicing Muslim, she does not publicize her 
religiosity or seek religious accommodation, nor does she disclose her 
attendance at the local mosque. Because she adheres to the dominant color-
blind narrative that discrimination is an anachronistic anomaly rather than 
part of a systemic societal problem, she does not participate in civil rights 
activities in defense of Muslims, Arabs, or South Asians.  
In the end, the identity-covering Muslim woman becomes the accepted 
“cultural Muslim” women, rather than the suspected “practicing Muslim” 
woman. In doing so, she seeks to be the exception to the negative stereotypes 
in order to avoid having to confront the adverse effects of such stereotypes. So 
long as she is always a pleasant and deferential woman, assimilated into the 
majority group’s culture, and downplays her religious and ethnic identity, her 
disclosed Muslim and ethnic identities are viewed as proof of the organization’s 
emphasis on diversity. Indeed, she becomes the exhibit to which the employer 
points to when it is accused of discrimination by a Muslim woman who refuses 
or cannot convert, hide, or cover her subordinated identities. In short, the less 
she “acts Muslim” or “acts Muslim female” in ways that the majority group 
finds threatening or discomforting, the more likely she is to receive equal 
employment opportunities.    
Paradoxically, even if a Muslim woman is willing to accommodate coercive 
assimilationism, she may still find herself denied equal opportunities because 
of the intersectionality of her identities. In other words, she may trigger one 
stereotype in her attempts to counter another. For instance, the more assertive 
a Muslim woman is—as a means of casting off misperceptions of her passivity 
or inability to lead—the more likely she may trigger stereotypes of Muslims as 
aggressive and threatening. In addition, if she tries to counter the stereotype 
of the meek and oppressed Muslim woman, she may trigger gender stereotypes 
that disparagingly portray driven and assertive women as abrasive, arrogant, 
and competitive—characteristics deemed assets for men in the workplace. 
Thus, a Muslim woman’s assertiveness may simultaneously violate gender 
norms, further exposing her to discrimination based on gender stereotyping.   
To offset these stereotypes, her attempts to exercise deference—to dispel 
suspicions of her loyalty or “civility”—reinforce stereotypes of her as 
submissive and unable to lead.23 Furthermore, depending on her actual or 
perceived racial or ethnic identity, a Muslim woman’s behavior, dress, speech, 
and mannerisms may trigger negative stereotypes associated with African 
23 Jen’nan Ghazel Read & John Bartkowski, To Veil or Not to Veil?: A Case Study of Identity 
Negotiation Among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 395, 396 (2000); 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1, 7 (2009). 
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Americans, Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghanis, or other non-white groups. 24 If she 
refuses to be “the good woman,” “the good Muslim,” or “the good minority 
employee,” she will be stigmatized and penalized under the pretext that she is 
insubordinate, too aggressive, not a team player, not professional, or just not 
the right fit. 
A strong and assertive personality may also cause the majority group to 
feel threatened by a Muslim, whose loyalties are quickly questioned when she 
shows any signs of aggression or disagreement with authority. Additionally, if 
the identity she is meticulously covering is exposed as too religious or too 
ethnic, she may be suspected of duplicity and deception. In the end she is 
damned if she does and damned if she doesn’t, thereby leaving her to choose 
between the lesser of two depraved options, both of which deny her meaningful 
equal opportunities and control over her identity.  
All of this begs the question: Who are we to judge how a Muslim woman 
chooses to perform her multiple identities? So what if she chooses to wear short 
skirts and sleeveless shirts, uncovers her hair, hides her associations with 
Muslims, supports American militarism in the Middle East, or uses an English 
nickname? Even though we may be uncomfortable making these judgments 
about Muslim women’s identity performances, the reality is that employers do 
so every day; employers act on their judgments of employees’ identity 
performance through distribution of resources and access to opportunities in 
the workplace based on subjective, majoritarian values and cultural norms.  As 
a result, minority employees who fail or refuse to accommodate those values 
and norms, often guised under the rubric of “professionalism,” “civility,” or 
“collegiality,” may be overlooked for promotion, given lower quality work 
assignments, denied access to clients, set on a marginalized career track, or 
terminated.   
24 Irene Browne & Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market, 29 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 487, 490 (2003); William H. Turner, Myths and Stereotypes: The African Man in America, 
in THE BLACK MALE IN AMERICA 123 (Doris Y. Wilkinson & Ronald L. Taylor eds., 1977). See also 
Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination Against African-American Males: 
Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 34–
35 (1996) (discussing the stereotypical perceptions of African-American men by white Americans 
and foreigners); Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, 
and Inner-City Workers, 38 SOC. PROBS. 433, 440 (1991) (finding that 47.2 percent of Chicago 
employers surveyed felt that inner-city African-American workers in selected occupations lacked 
work ethic); Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia is Creating a 
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2012) (explaining that Arabs have 
“collectively [been] indicted . . . as public enemy #1—brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics 
and money-mad cultural ‘others’ bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians 
and Jews . . . Arabs are brute murderers, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and 
abusers of women”); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes, 
36  WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (1994) (explaining that Asians are stereotyped as the “model 
minority” implying that “Asian Americans, through their hard work, intelligence, and emphasis 
on education and achievement have been successful in American society”). But see Miranda Oshige 
McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the “Model Minority Myth”, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 331, 331 
(2006) (arguing that the “positive image of Asian Americans as a model minority conceals a more 
sinister core of beliefs about Asian Americans and other racial minorities in America”). 
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The potential harms of coercive assimilationism are not only economic, but 
also causes psychological harm to minorities—both assimilating and non-
assimilating—from which members of the majority group are shielded.25 For 
instance, social psychologists have documented that individuals who refuse or 
are unable to assimilate are stigmatized by the majority group.26 Furthermore, 
minorities who choose to assimilate may be stigmatized by their own minority 
group, as they are derogatorily called “sellouts.” As a consequence of coercive 
assimilationism, minorities suffer lower self-esteem than those who feel a 
sense of belonging to their minority in-group, and if the majority group merely 
tolerates, but does not fully accept the identity-passing or covering Muslim 
woman as a member of the group, she may find herself emotionally and 
psychologically isolated. Over time, such psychological pressures affect a 
minority employees’ wellbeing, which, in turn, affects her work performance in 
ways not experienced by employees who belong to the majority group.  The 
more an employee must focus on “fitting in,” the less time and mental energy 
she has to focus on performing her job—placing her at a marked disadvantage 
to employees whose values, norms, and cultures are the basis for written and 
unwritten workplace rules. 
For these reasons, judges should be skeptical of catch-all terms, such as 
“professionalism,” “collegiality,” “civility,” and “workplace culture” as 
justifications for adverse employment actions.  While these terms may appear 
neutral on their face, they are laden with values that privilege certain races, 
ethnicities, religions, and genders over others in ways that are not necessarily 
job-related.   
While there is no perfect solution to this social and political problem that 
affects workplaces across the country, I argue that it can be mitigated by 
having judges understand the pernicious effects of implicit bias rooted in 
stereotypes. One place to start is to seriously consider plaintiffs’ arguments 
that their disparate treatment arises from how they perform their religious, 
racial, or gender identities, not simply the identity per se. In addition, 
purported professionalism standards should not be taken as facially neutral, 
but rather be examined as subjective rules based on the values of those who 
develop them—a group not necessarily representative of America’s diverse 
labor pool.   
The vague behavioral components of professionalism standards can be 
particularly pernicious. For instance, traits such as good judgment, civility, 
collegiality, and effective communication are often cited as components of 
professionalism.27 These are subjective terms, whose definitions depend on the 
25 Bandsuch, supra note 5, at 294–95. 
26 Nyla Branscombe & Naomi Ellemers, Coping with Group-Based Discrimination: Individualistic 
Versus Group-Level Strategies, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 259 (Janet K. Swim & 
Charles Stangor eds., 1998). 
27 See Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law: 
The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER 
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interpreter and are inherently associated with a particular set of cultural 
norms and values. When infected with implicit bias, professionalism codes can 
provide pretext for unlawful disparate treatment of minority groups.28 
Furthermore, implicit bias homogenizes employees within protected groups to 
hire, promote, and retain only those able and willing to assimilate to the 
majority culture with minimal regard for whether such assimilationist 
demands are job-related.29   
Simply having a “colorful picture” of the various colors, genders, and 
ethnicities represented in a particular workplace does not necessarily evince a 
discrimination-free environment. Workplace dress codes that prohibit hair 
styles unique to African Americans discriminate based on racial stereotypes 
that dreadlocks, braids, or cornrows are dirty, disheveled, or strange.30 
Professionalism standards that effectively reward deferential and perpetually 
pleasant women, while penalizing overtly confident and assertive women 
discriminate based on gender stereotypes—particularly when the same 
standards are not applied to male employees.31   
As such, judges should incorporate applicable social-psychology literature 
into their analysis and adjudication of employment discrimination cases, which 
documents the psychological, dignitary, and material harms caused by 
stereotyping and the disproportionate pressures to assimilate placed upon 
minorities.32 Judges should acknowledge that minority employees must work 
harder and exert more mental energies than their non-minority coworkers in 
order to be recognized as competent and worthy of being there. All of this 
consumes their energy and distracts their mental focus away from performing 
the work, which directly contradicts formalist liberal conceptions of “equal pay 
for equal work” and merit-based employment. By considering the social science 
literature, judges will be better equipped to judiciously examine employers’ 
arguments that because other employees within the plaintiffs’ protected 
class(es) were not disparately treated, the plaintiff suffered no discrimination. 
As long as the minority employee is willing to convert, pass, or cover her 
subordinated identity, the majority group will play along with the employee 
and pretend the employee is not in fact Muslim, Arab, or South Asian.  It is 
L. & POL’Y  369, 377 (2007) (examining how employers engage in cultural profiling through the use 
of professionalism codes, among other things, to penalize employees who engage in deviant 
cultural behavior).  
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., RIVERA, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
30 Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (And Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got To Do With 
It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1388 (2008). 
31 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989).  
32 See Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM  L. REV. 37, 44–45 (2009) (noting that 
social scientists have identified biases and stereotypes which they could “explain for legal decision 
makers”). 
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only when we can honestly declare that a Muslim woman of color has the same 
agency and choice as a member of the majority group in performing her 
multiple identities in ways that she finds authentic and non-oppressive, 
without being penalized in the workplace, that we can celebrate progress in 
civil rights. Until then, we have much work to do.  
 
 
